Eden`s assurances clearly did not touch Chou deeply. On 18 July, Mr. Chou met with the Lao Minister of Foreign Affairs and presented “unofficial” but extravagant demands, which he considered completely unacceptable. Laos was ready to supply the elements of resistance in [illiant] zones in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua; Chou also proposed parts of the provinces of Luang Prabang and Xien Khouang. The royal government was always prepared to grant the insurgents freedom of movement in these areas, but Chou requested the administration by common royally transferred committees and a joint oversight committee in Vientiane until the legislative elections of August 1955. Finally, while the Laotians thought that the question of the foundations of the French Union had been resolved in their favour, Chou said now that the bases had to be completely eliminated, although they were defined by the Franco-Laotian treaty. Despite the general agreement of the main provisions of the agreements with the seven points, the fact that another area was formally ceded to the Communists clearly weighed heavily on the administration. When documents were drafted for the National Security Council in August, the Geneva conference was seen as a major defeat for American diplomacy and a potential disaster for U.S. security interests in the Far East. In its progress report on NSC document 5405 at the time, the Operations Control Board said the conference`s final statement “made great progress in communism that could lead to the loss of Southeast Asia. It has therefore suffered a radical defeat of the key policies of NSC 5405 and a heavy loss for the free world, whose psychological and political effects will be felt throughout the Far East and around the world. In a separate report, the NSC was a little more specific about the extent of the damage, but no less. The Communists acquired in Vietnam “a breakthrough” for military and non-military purposes; the United States had lost its prestige as a leader in Asia, capable of curbing communist expansion; the communist line of peace had won at the expense of America; and communist military and political prestige had been enhanced by their proven ability to exploit unstable situations in Southeast Asian countries without resorting to armed attacks. Bedell Smith, who revealed a much more flexible attitude towards the communist world, was able to shut down Washington`s approval at the partial American acceptance of the final declaration.
On 19 July, he had been approached by Mends-France, who had tried from the outset to identify the United States as closely as possible with the final conditions, proposing that Washington not only respect the military agreements reached, but take note of them, as well as the political statements contained in the first nine paragraphs of the proposed conference statement. Mends-France stressed that the French would be very disappointed if the United States could not at least read these parts of the declaration.