Proponents of this interpretation also note that, during the war, thousands of proclamations were abandoned in all parts of Palestine, carrying a message from Sharif Hussein on the one hand and a message from the British command, on the other, saying “that an Anglo-Arab agreement was reached to guarantee the independence of the Arabs”. [s] In July 1915, Hussein took the opportunity to send a letter to mcMahon indicating the conditions under which he would consider a partnership with the British. Hussein, who claimed to represent all Arabs, did aspire to independence for the entire Arabic-speaking country in eastern Egypt, but Mr. McMahon insisted that certain areas within the French sphere of influence, such as the districts of Mersina and Alexandertta and the lands west of Damascus (Homs, Hama and Aleppo – that is, modern Lebanon ), would not be taken into account, stressing that British interests in Baghdad and Basra required special attention. Hussein objected, with the exception of the territories claimed by France, and established that certain rules should govern British activity in Baghdad and Basra, conditions to which McMahon did not agree. In the end, things were discussed later. In the end, the highly ambiguous correspondence was by no means a formal treaty and disagreements on several points were not resolved. After the publication of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, which wrote a letter from British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a prosperous and eminent leader of the British Jewish community who promised the Jews of Palestine a national homeland, and then the disclosure of the secret Sykes-Picot Convention of 1916, in which Britain and France proposed to divide and occupy parts of the territory. , the Sharif and other Arab leaders considered the agreements reached in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence to be flouted. Hussein refused to ratify the 1919 Treaty of Versaille and, in response to a 1921 British proposal to sign a treaty to adopt the mandate system, he said he could not expect to “put his name in a document that allocates Palestine to Zionists and Syria to foreigners.” [9] Another British attempt to obtain a treaty failed in 1923/24 and negotiations were suspended in March 1924; [10] In six months, the British withdrew their support for their ally in the central Arab Ibn Saud, who conquered the kingdom of Hussein.

[11] Third.- For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such a preference for business, the two high-ranking contracting parties will offer mutual assistance in order to offer the best capacity of their military and naval forces to confront any foreign power likely to attack one of the two sides. Peace must not be decided without the unity of both parties. The debate on Palestine was born because the McMahon-Hussein correspondence does not explicitly mention Palestine, but falls within the limits originally proposed by Hussein. Mr. McMahon accepted Hussein`s borders “subject to change”[74] and proposed that “parts of Syria west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be described as pure Arab and should be excluded.” [14] Until 1920, British government documents suggested that Palestine should be part of the Arab region; Their interpretation changed in 1920, resulting in differences of opinion between Arabs and The British, with each party presenting arguments of support for their positions on the basis of subtle details of the text and the historical circumstances of the correspondence. [75] Jonathan Schneer provides an analogy to explain the central conflict over meaning: in late 1918, Hussein`s son Faisal invaded Damascus and began to found an administration there that he believed ended with his father`s understanding of the British.