Finally, we led Japan to agree on the language in the joint communiqué, which says that Korea is essential to the security of Japan and the United States and that Taiwan`s security is more important. Once we agreed on this language, things started to fall for you. Thus, in November [1969], we and the Japanese were able to explain that the Ryukyus would return to Japan in 1972. We needed time between 1969 and 1972 to complete a huge amount of budget and accounting tasks to transfer the administration to Japan….. The issues that arose in 1969 to overthrow the Ryukyus must therefore also take into account the fact that the security treaty with Japan could not be renewed by the Japanese in the event of the collapse of japan`s negotiations. Meanwhile, there was great Japanese pressure on us to do “something” against the Ryukyus. At the time, Japan was not aware of the policy change in the United States, Yanai said, adding that it was possible that the United States could already improve relations with China at the same time as discussions on Okinawa`s return to Japan. Most people thought it was good to end this period in our history. The ryukyu question had been a constant point between us and the Japanese, which we had to eliminate.

A key element of the agreement was the maintenance of U.S. military bases at Ryukyus; Without that, we would never have obtained a convention or DOD agreement. Special Envoy Kishi met with President Nixon with two preconceived vows. On April 1, 1969, Kishi told President Nixon: “Many Japanese feel that it is completely unacceptable for a part of their country to remain occupied by a foreign power if Japan is to play a greater role in Asia.” Kishi also believed that maintaining the status quo in Okinawa could risk political consequences. President Nixon assured him that he was well informed on the subject and that relations between Japan and the United States were important to him. [7] As you know, the development of most communiqués always precedes agreements and visits.